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I bid a warm welcome today to all of you attending this conference, held jointly by the Bank of 
Korea and the BIS. Let me first single out for appreciation our keynote speakers, Governor 
Stefan Ingves of the Swedish Riksbank and Professor Hyun Song Shin of Princeton 
University. Their attendance as lecturers adds special lustre to our proceedings. I anticipate 
that, with their abundant experience and keen powers of discernment, these two experts will 
have great insights for us concerning the new policy tasks and changes in role of central 
banks since the global financial crisis. My thanks go out in addition to Eli Remolona, Chief 
Representative of the BIS Asia and Pacific Representative Office; Christine Cumming, First 
Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Ignazio Visco, Deputy Director 
General and Member of Governing Board of the Bank of Italy; David Longworth, Former 
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, and to all of our other chairs, presenters and 
discussants, for your efforts to make this conference a success.  
The global financial crisis has shown us the importance of shifting to a new paradigm in the 
macrofinancial stability framework as well as in the international financial order. In particular, 
a broad consensus in the international community has developed on the necessity of 
designing various tools, including macroprudential policies, to counter the heightened mood 
of anxiety we now see everywhere concerning systemic risk. This being the case, the theme 
of our conference, “Macroprudential regulation and policy”, will be viewed with intense 
interest by the central banks and regulatory authorities that are responsible for financial 
stability. I am sure that the invaluable comments and policy proposals raised during this 
week’s conference will be of great help to central banks and those in charge of government 
policy throughout the world. 
Lessons of the global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis that we are witnessing is the greatest shock to the world economy 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, in terms of both intensity and duration. Even now 
the financial markets have not fully recovered to their pre-crisis level of activity. Nor can we 
rule out the possibility of the current recovery faltering, in view of the prolonged crisis 
aftershocks such as the continuing contagion from the European debt crisis. Various new 
expressions have consequently made their way into the mass media, including talk of a 
“two-speed global recovery”, amid worries of widening of the gap in recovery between 
advanced economies and the newly emerging market economies, and of a so-called 
“three-way split”, envisioning divergent patterns of economic growth in the United States, 
Europe and emerging markets including China.  
When we look back at the history of economic crises, we find that, while they may have 
always been accompanied by massive financial and economic losses, they have also 
sparked reforms of existing systems. And so, as suggested by the expression “don't waste a 
crisis”, if we can learn a lesson from it, a crisis can also be a valuable experience. We 
therefore need to work our way toward practical and concrete proposals to avoid a repetition 
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of this financial crisis based on the painful lessons we have learned. In this light, this week’s 
conference will, I am sure, be a most timely and significant meeting of minds.  
We can, I think, draw several vital policy lessons from the recent global financial crisis.  
First and foremost, no matter how sound the economy of a country is in terms of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, its financial system is closely tied to the international financial 
markets. It may therefore be suddenly hit by the rapid worldwide spread of a shock from 
accumulated financial imbalances. In particular, the web of linkages between financial 
institutions acts to allocate risk efficiently when the going is good, but in times of turmoil it 
serves as a channel for risk transmission. It follows that the risk to the financial system 
overall is massively larger than the simple total of the risks of individual financial institutions. 
It is therefore extremely important to manage risk on the basis of the financial system as a 
whole, given the difficulty of securing macrofinancial stability solely through the 
microprudential regulation of individual financial institutions.  
Second, while financial innovation does indeed promote efficiency, it can also act to foment 
financial imbalances. Furthermore, when the financial sector’s growth outpaces that of the 
real sector, it may destabilise the macro economy. It is therefore hard to say for sure whether 
apparent financial development always plays a beneficial role in sustainable economic 
growth.  
Third, price stability cannot by itself guarantee financial stability. Where the economy 
maintains low prices and rapid growth for a lengthy period of time, it is not unlikely that an 
accumulation of financial imbalances threatening financial system stability will be overlooked. 
Last but not least, in a world economy of great mutual dependency between the financial and 
real sectors of the economy, to counter global financial crises we have no option but to turn 
to international cooperation. Fortunately, in the early stages of this last crisis, it proved 
possible to achieve successful international policy cooperation through the G20, the premium 
forum that leads the international debate on world economic stability. Under the aegis of the 
G20, moreover, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) efficiently headed up international cooperation in the sphere of financial 
regulation. 
Macroprudential policy tasks 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the dangers of systemic risk propagation must be 
recognised and the macroprudential soundness of the economy as a whole enhanced so as 
to counter them. Prior to the global financial crisis, financial systemic risk was insufficiently 
understood, and we cannot deny that the significance of such risk was underestimated. 
Similarly, in seeking to reduce the severe damage to the real economy arising from systemic 
risk, we need to move away from an emphasis on microprudential regulation to an approach 
that also incorporates a macroeconomic policy dimension.  
Based on the aforementioned lessons from the global financial crisis, countries around the 
world are now involved in drawing up various plans for underpinning sustainable and 
balanced growth in a process centring on the G20. And, at the last G20 Summit in Seoul, 
substantial outcomes were achieved in the move towards the introduction of macroprudential 
policy-based financial regulation. That said, a large number of issues remain unresolved, as 
macroprudential regulation is still in its infancy.  
Let me cite some examples. How should financial stability, which is the goal of 
macroprudential policy, be defined? And again, how can we reconcile macroprudential policy 
tools with our instruments of microprudential regulation? Further, how should we pursue 
financial stability jointly with monetary policy, which emphasises price stability, and what 
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cooperation with the supervisory authorities? On these and other issues, proposals based 
either on experience or on concrete theoretical grounds have yet to be presented.  
Meanwhile, the correction of disequilibria in the global economy is an overall imperative, not 
just to eliminate the factors behind the current crisis but also to secure the future stability of 
the international financial order. We should therefore step up efforts to resolve the global 
imbalances in trade and capital movements that were among the root causes of the global 
financial crisis. Although the issue of these global imbalances has repeatedly loomed as a 
problem in the past, the international community has hardly started to undertake joint efforts 
to reduce them.  
I hope that before long a consensus will be reached, under the aegis of the G20, on 
indicative guidelines for current account positions designed to resolve the global imbalances.  
The existing framework of global financial regulation was largely designed with advanced 
countries and the banking sector in mind. And because of financial innovation and the like, 
the financial system has undergone great structural transformation with the rapid growth of 
the parallel “shadow banking system” encompassing investment banks, hedge funds and 
special purpose vehicles. In keeping with the reform of the financial environment, therefore, 
all major financial institutions in the markets, irrespective of their legal forms, should now be 
made subject to regulation. Furthermore, international consensus has also formed on the 
need for strengthening regulation of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). In 
practice, however, it has not been possible yet to draw up international standards for the 
selection of SIFIs, or for the method of their regulation. Within emerging market countries, 
similarly, the need for the regulation of SIFIs has now clearly emerged and very thorough 
discussion of this issue is called for. 
In addition, concrete research is required to identify how the reorganisation of the 
international financial order will impact the financial structure and the financial and capital 
markets of emerging market economies. What effects the new capital and liquidity 
regulations decided on at the recent G20 Seoul summit will have on our the current interest 
rate-oriented monetary policy must also be determined. New factors restricting monetary 
policy may also be on the horizon. I am thinking here, for example, of the possibility of a 
conflict with interest rate policy arising from the liquidity control function of a countercyclical 
capital buffer, which is among the macroprudential policy instruments now being discussed.  
Closing words 
Historically, economic crises have led to crises in the field of economics itself. And 
economists and economic institutions by and large failed to predict the recent global financial 
crisis until it actually erupted, owing to their lack of understanding of speculation in the real 
estate market and of the behaviour and competition structures of banks. Nor can central 
banks escape this criticism. At the same time, however, the status of central banks has risen 
since the crisis, given their energetic participation as lenders of last resort in the process of 
overcoming it, in a manner very different from that seen during previous crises. However, 
there is also a heightened possibility now that the monetary policy credibility of central banks 
will be weakened, due to the conflict between their policy goals of financial system stability 
and price stability. In this context, as guardian of the financial system, the central bank is 
called upon by society to bear the responsibility for macroprudential regulation and policy, 
and to carry out the related tasks of analysis and examination. 
As I have previously noted, the most vital and difficult mission now confronting us is the 
efficient management of systemic risk. And for this purpose I see it necessary to operate 
more advanced forms of regulatory surveillance and macrofinancial stability policy, to secure 
a more diverse range of policy instruments for ensuring soundness, and to further strengthen 
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BIS on developing and introducing macroprudential policy instruments has now also been 
reinvigorated. Notably, with regard to newly emerging market countries, which are relatively 
more exposed to excessive market risk and foreign currency liquidity risk than advanced 
countries, detailed evaluation is needed of the influence on their financial systems of 
proposed new micro- and macroprudential regulatory tools. And attention must also be given 
to choosing the right combination of regulations that can bring about the largest synergy 
effects.  
As we have seen during the recent global financial crisis, the bankruptcy of huge financial 
conglomerates can potentially weaken the function of market competition – not only by 
heightening systemic risk but also due to too-big- or too-connected-to-fail expectations and 
the consequent possibility of government bailout. The macroprudential framework should 
thus be designed from a holistic perspective to prevent side effects arising from possible 
structural changes in the financial market and to shore up the function of the financial system 
in the long run.  
I look forward to constructive and thorough discussions today and tomorrow on the meaning 
of macroprudential regulation and policy, on the tasks ahead, and on the role of the central 
bank in this regard. It will also be valuable if we can put our heads together to consider the 
impact of macroprudential policy on the real economy, and its relationship to other economic 
policies.  
Drawing my remarks to a close, I should once again like to voice my deepest thanks to you 
all for setting aside some of your valuable time to be here. I know how busy the schedule is, 
but I do hope you will also have a chance, during your all too short stay here, to savour the 
beauty of Korea’s culture and natural environment. 